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FOREWORD
In recent years the distribution of the world’s exploitable energy reserves has shifted markedly. One
major change is the discovery of substantial gas deposits offshore the Levant. But while these deposits
have the potential to revolutionize the economies of
the net energy importers, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Israel,
they also bring into sharp focus long-running disputes
over maritime boundaries and sovereignty. In short,
these deposits provide yet another cause for conflict
in an already deeply troubled region.
This monograph explores both the positive and
negative implications of the Eastern Mediterranean’s
new gas reserves for the region, and the implications
of both for U.S. interests. It combines the recognized
expertise of two researchers with long experience
in regional and energy studies, respectively. Their
conclusion is that the management of these new energy resources is likely to influence significantly the
relationships among the states in the region, particularly between Israel and its neighbors, including the
Palestinian Territories.
The Strategic Studies Institute therefore recommends this monograph not only for its direct relevance
to energy studies, but also to policymakers working
with the broader issues of the Levant and Eastern
Mediterranean as a whole.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The East Mediterranean has been witnessing an
unparalleled natural resource boom since the late2000s, when Israel, followed by Cyprus, made its first
significant offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in many
years. These discoveries have since proven to be substantially larger than any other resources previously
explored in the East Mediterranean Sea. A 2010 U.S.
Geological Survey suggests the Levant basin—the
area including Cyprus and Israel’s offshore zones,
and the offshore and some onshore territories of Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories—could hold
as many as 1.7 billion barrels of oil and up to 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, leaving as much as
two thirds of the region’s potential resource base still
undiscovered.
The East Mediterranean’s newly discovered and
potential future hydrocarbon resources are of tremendous economic and geostrategic significance, not
only for the region itself but also for its main allies,
including the United States. Economically, emerging
gas producers Israel and Cyprus stand to gain considerably from their newly discovered gas wealth, which
provides both a cost-effective source of energy for their
historically import-dependent energy economies and
a potential high-value source of revenues from gas exports into and beyond the region. Geostrategically, the
presence of hydrocarbon resources in the East Mediterranean opens a great deal of opportunity for closer
regional cooperation, but it also raises the potential
for conflict over these valuable resources. The region
also hosts two of the world’s most intractable border
conflicts: the Arab-Israeli conflict, involving territorial
disputes between Israel, the Palestinians, Lebanon,
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and Syria, and the unresolved Cypriot question, leading to disputed boundaries on land and at sea and
disputed ownership over hydrocarbon resources between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities.
This shifting energy landscape in the East Mediterranean is thus also significant for the region’s main
political and military partnerships. Israel, Cyprus,
and Turkey are key strategic U.S. allies. Neighboring
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon play important roles from
the European and U.S. perspective, both as direct
neighbors to Israel and the Palestinian Territories as
well as because of their strategically important location as the geographic interconnection between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Regional and
extra-regional military alliances could be put under
tension as a result of shifting geopolitical weight and
relations between the key regional players, as well as
the risk of re-emerging boundary conflicts following
discoveries of subsea hydrocarbon resources. There
is the potential for considerable policy dilemmas for
the United States, if its local security partners find
themselves having a confrontation over hydrocarbon
resources and maritime boundaries.
This monograph provides an overview of recent
hydrocarbon discoveries and their significance for the
region’s resource holders; it also explores the possible
implications of these resources for the region’s security landscape, their potential to fuel conflict, and options to foster closer regional cooperation and trade
integration. It discusses the role U.S. diplomacy and
military support could play to ensure continued stability, security, and regional support within the East
Mediterranean’s shifting geoeconomic framework.
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REGIONALIZING EAST MEDITERRANEAN GAS:
ENERGY SECURITY, STABILITY,
AND THE U.S. ROLE
INTRODUCTION
The East Mediterranean has been witnessing an
unparalleled natural resource boom since the late2000s, when Israel, followed by Cyprus, made its first
significant offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in many
years. These discoveries have since proven to be substantially larger than any other resources previously
explored in the East Mediterranean Sea. At the time of
this writing, they consist primarily of natural gas, although liquids are expected to be discovered offshore
as well, including in the potentially hydrocarbon-rich
waters of Lebanon and Syria. A 2010 U.S. Geological
Survey suggests the Levant basin—the area including
Cyprus and Israel’s offshore zones, and the offshore
and some onshore territories of Syria, Lebanon, and
the Palestinian Territories—could hold as much as
1.7 billion barrels of oil and up to 122 trillion cubic
feet (tcf) of natural gas, leaving as much as two-thirds
of the region’s potential resource base still
undiscovered.1
The East Mediterranean’s newly discovered and
potential future hydrocarbon resources are of tremendous economic and geostrategic significance not
only for the region itself but also for its main allies,
including the United States. Economically, emerging
gas producers Israel and Cyprus stand to gain considerably from their newly discovered gas wealth,
which provides both a cost-effective source of energy
for their historically import-dependent energy economies, and a potential high-value source of revenues
from gas exports into and beyond the region.
1

Geostrategically, the presence of hydrocarbon resources in the East Mediterranean opens a great deal
of opportunity for closer regional cooperation, but it
also raises the potential for conflict over these valuable
resources. The region also hosts two of the world’s
most intractable border conflicts: the Arab-Israeli conflict, involving territorial disputes between Israel, the
Palestinians, Lebanon, and Syria, and the unresolved
Cypriot question, leading to disputes over boundaries on land and at sea, and disputes of the ownership
over hydrocarbon resources, between the Greek- and
Turkish-Cypriot communities.
This shifting energy landscape in the East Mediterranean is also significant for the region’s main political
and military allies. Israel, Cyprus, and Turkey are key
strategic U.S. allies. Neighboring Egypt, Syria, and
Lebanon play important roles from the European and
U.S. perspective, both as direct neighbors to Israel and
the Palestinian Territories as well as because of their
strategically important location as the geographic interconnection between Europe, North Africa, and the
Middle East. Regional and extra-regional military alliances could be put under tension as a result of shifting
geopolitical weight and relations between key regional players, as well as the risk of re-emerging boundary
conflicts following discoveries of subsea hydrocarbon
resources. There is the potential for considerable policy dilemmas for the United States, if its local security
partners find themselves in conflict over hydrocarbon
resources and maritime boundaries.
This monograph will explore the strategic consequences of recent natural gas discoveries for the East
Mediterranean security landscape, through the lens of
U.S. security interests in the region. It first provides an
overview of recent hydrocarbon discoveries and their
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significance for the region’s resource holders; this is
followed by an exploration of the possible implications
of these resources for the region’s security landscape,
their potential to fuel conflict, and options to foster
closer regional cooperation and trade integration. We
then look at the role U.S. diplomacy and military support could play to ensure continued stability, security,
and regional support within the East Mediterranean’s
shifting geoeconomic framework.
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF SUMMARY
OF EAST MEDITERRANEAN
HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 2000s
The East Mediterranean has been a relatively slow
starter in terms of offshore exploratory activities. With
most exploration work focused on less challenging
on-land territory, much of the Levant appeared to be
the Middle East’s only remaining hydrocarbon-poor
province. With the exception of Syria, which had
been the only regional producer of significant oil and
natural gas for several decades,2 the remainder of the
East Mediterranean was, as a result, a net-importing
region, with Israelis, Cypriots, Lebanese, and Palestinians having long depended on imports for virtually
their entire domestic energy needs.3 The recent discoveries offshore Israel and Cyprus will completely
change this picture: similar prospects for Lebanon
and, potentially, the Palestinians could emerge if similar commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits materialize in their own territorial waters.
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Israel’s Breakthrough Discoveries.
Israel has one of the East Mediterranean’s most
extensive exploration histories, reaching back as
far as the 1950s. As direct consequence of the ArabIsraeli conflict and Israel’s resulting isolation among
its Arab neighbors, there was strong historical interest
in any means of increasing the country’s energy selfsufficiency, and thereby in reducing Israel’s exposure
to supply risks via trade embargos and the interruption of trade routes by land and sea.4 While it soon
became apparent that the Levant—the small strip of
land extending from Syria in the North down southward to the Gaza Strip—would be no second Arabian
Peninsula in terms of hydrocarbon resources, Israeli
exploration efforts were rewarded in 1998-99 with the
small, but nevertheless significant, discovery of the
Noa and Mari-B fields just off the Israeli coastline.5
The two fields were comparably small, but with 1.5tcf of reserves, Mari-B proved large enough to make
production commercially viable and to contribute toward Israel’s domestic gas supply by the mid-2000s.6
Mari-B has been in operation since 2004, and together
with Noa, remains until today Israel’s only producing
gas fields, covering around 60 percent of the country’s
natural gas demand.7
The picture of some isolated, small Israeli gas finds
changed significantly during the late-2000s, however.
Owing to consistent further exploration efforts, Israel
was able to report a series of commercial gas discoveries starting in 2009, with the discovery of the 9.7-tcf
Tamar field by a consortium led by U.S. Noble in cooperation with several smaller Israeli companies.8 This
large (by East Mediterranean standards) exploration
success was further topped by the 2010 discovery of
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the 19-tcf Leviathan field close to the maritime boundary with Cyprus, which has so far remained one of the
largest single discoveries in the entire offshore Mediterranean.9 Discoveries followed of smaller fields:
Sara (1.47-tcf) and Dalit (350-530 million cubic feet),
both in 2009, Myra (4.24-tcf) in 2010, and further fields
thereafter.10 While most of Israel’s natural gas discoveries have yet to translate into proven gas reserves, in
2013 Israel held a total of 9.48-tcf of proven and 30-tcf
estimated reserves, positioning Israel ahead of all East
Mediterranean countries in terms of gas reserves and
resource prospectivity.11
Cypriot Gas.
Cyprus, bordering the geographical structure that
since the early-2000s has been believed to hold substantial hydrocarbon potential, began its own offshore
exploration program during that decade. With historically no hydrocarbon reserves, and as a geographical
island state, Cyprus has had few energy options and
has relied on oil imports for its entire energy needs.12
Rising prices of oil on international markets since 2002
and the country’s growing financial difficulties since
the late-2000s have given additional political impetus
to the island’s own natural resource exploration program. Cypriot efforts were rewarded in 2011 with the
discovery of significant hydrocarbon deposits in its
most southeasterly economic zone in Block 12, with
an estimated resource base of between 3- and 9-tcf.13
Cyprus has since tendered out four more offshore
blocks, which have been signed up for by consortia
led by European majors ENI and Total, and is planning for another licensing round in late-2014-15.14
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Other East Mediterranean possibilities: Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories.
Israel and Cyprus’s exploration successes sparked
substantial interest in neighboring countries as well.
Syria, the most experienced gas producer in the East
Mediterranean, followed Israel’s initial discoveries in
1998 with exploration efforts in its own offshore territories, though the priority given to onshore production reduced the pace at which these efforts were pursued. An exception to the East Mediterranean’s lack
of historical oil and gas reserves, Syria already holds
small, but essentially proven, oil and natural gas reserves of 2.5 oil barrels (bbl) and 8.5-tcf respectively,
allowing Syria energy self-sufficiency for most of its
modern history as well as moderately sized exports of
oil to Turkey and Europe, currently disrupted due to
civil war in the country.15
In May 2007, the Syrian government launched a
first offshore bidding round, which ended with no
rewards despite modest initial investor interest. This
resulted from a combination of discouraging factors
for international investors, including geopolitical and
cost-benefit deterrents.16 A second bidding round
in early-2012 had to be cancelled due to the gradual
deterioration of domestic stability following the outbreak of civil protests and infighting as the political
upheavals of the Arab Spring began to sweep into
Syria in early-2011.17 Syria’s descent into civil war has
since prevented any re-emergence of offshore exploration efforts, while the series of international sanctions
that has followed various atrocities in the continuing
conflict makes foreign investment in the sector nearly
impossible at the time of this writing.18 Once the Syria
conflict is resolved, prospects for Syrian offshore pro-
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duction—provided commercial resources are found—
are high; Syria’s existing experience as a producer of
both oil and gas should help the country develop any
potential offshore resources relatively smoothly once
the political situation allows for any new exploration
efforts in its offshore territories.
Another interested neighbor with substantial geological prospects for offshore hydrocarbons is Lebanon. Lebanon’s exploration work commenced during
the 2000s, followed (after much haggling over political posts) by the institutionalization of exploration licensing, with the creation of a Petroleum Authority in
December 2012 and the launch of the country’s first
bidding round in February 2013.19 Political stalemate
in the absence of a parliament with decisionmaking
powers has since delayed the finalization of the legal
framework for an award of exploration and production licenses, and resolution appears remote at the
time of this writing.20 The election of a new stable government in Lebanon able to resolve the current climate
of political stalemate is likely to speed up the award
of licenses and the exploration of Lebanon’s offshore
territory—currently stated by the Lebanese government to hold potential for as much as another 30-tcf of
natural gas as well as some 660 million barrels of oil.21
Similar to the remainder of the East Mediterranean, the Palestinian offshore territories near Gaza
are believed to hold substantial hydrocarbon potential. Exploration in Palestinian waters was, in fact,
already taking place during the 1990s, with two discoveries announced by an operating consortium led
by BG from the United Kingdom in 2000 off the coast
of Gaza. Control over Gaza’s offshore territories had
been relinquished in 1999 by Israel to the Palestinian
Authority (PA), rendering the development of these
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offshore discoveries in principle a Palestinian matter.22
A development plan for the 30 billion cubic meters
(bcm) (1-tcf) Gaza Marine field stumbled, however,
after obstruction by Israel over concerns regarding
the flow of revenues to Palestinian stakeholders, leaving the development of these resources unaddressed
until today.23
EAST MEDITERRANEAN HYDROCARBON
RESOURCES AND REGIONAL
CONFLICT POTENTIAL
The East Mediterranean has been a political flashpoint for much of its 20th- and 21st-century history.
The region encompasses two of the world’s most intractable political conflicts, the Arab-Israeli conflict,
fought out in several wars and in continued political
conflict between Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and political
opposition groups in both the Palestinian Territories
and other neighboring countries, and the still unresolved Cyprus conflict, drawing in neighboring Turkey. Both Israel and Cyprus are key U.S. allies and
pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the region: Israel, with
its long history of close political ties with the United
States, historically has stood at the heart of American
efforts to secure regional peace; while Cyprus forms
the most eastern part of Europe and is an important
strategic location for both U.S. and British military interests. East Mediterranean gas may complicate relations still further in this already geopolitically fragile
region, placing efforts to encourage regional cooperation at the center of any desirable policy response.
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The Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Arab-Israeli relations have held the Levant region
back from any fruitful economic cooperation for more
than half a century, and are likely to continue to affect progress in the East Mediterranean’s offshore resource development. In fact, the presence of valuable
natural resources in disputed territory may further
feed the conflict. Continued conflict between Israelis
and Palestinians over land and settling rights, and a
series of wars fought between Israel and several of its
Arab neighbors, have led to severely strained relations
between the two sides. Military action between Israel
and Gaza is ongoing, with the latest armed confrontation between Israel and Hamas since July 2014 serving as a painful reminder of the continued volatility of
Israeli-Palestinian relations. Diplomatc relations between Israel on the one hand, and Lebanon and Syria
on the other, remain nonexistent, with the two sides
still de facto at war.
The potentially enormous economic value of hydrocarbon discoveries for the region’s current and prospective producers raises the stakes, and furthermore,
provides an additional high-value target in any future
armed conflict between the various sides.24 The Bank
of Israel projects an overall positive effect of natural
gas production on the country’s balance of payments
of around $3.5 billion (bn) in 2014, and has announced
plans to purchase foreign currency during 2015. The
same projections suggest the natural gas industry may
contribute around 1 percent to the gross domestic
product (GDP) for 2013 (worth some $22 bn) and 0.7
percent in 2014.25 Other East Mediterranean countries
attach similar high values to the development of their
yet-to-be-explored offshore hydrocarbon resources;
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some Lebanese government estimates have placed the
value of Lebanon’s unconfirmed hydrocarbon riches
at between U.S.$300 bn and U.S.$700 bn, around seven
times the country’s current GDP, and a transformative factor for Lebanon’s economy, which has been in
disarray for many years.26
In the past, natural gas development and trade
have more than once fallen hostage to the region’s
geopolitical difficulties. One of the most direct consequences of strained Israeli-Palestinian relations has
been the lack of development of offshore gas resources
discovered offshore Gaza in the late-1990s, despite the
obvious economic benefits this development would
have offered to the infant Palestinian economy.27 Israel has blocked any development of the resources
since 2000 over concerns regarding the channeling of
Palestinian gas revenues into alleged terror finance,
supposedly funding armed attacks against the State
of Israel. A 4-year development plan for Gaza’s offshore resources approved by the PA has since been
discarded, while a breakdown in negotiations with
Israel has driven lead developer BG and its partnering
companies effectively to abandon Palestinian waters
despite the resources’ prospectivity.28
Continuing regional tensions give rise to concern
over both the security situation within Israel and the
stability of Israeli borders, not only with the Palestinian Territories but with other, neighboring Arab countries. Following the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime
in Egypt and subsequent political turmoil, Egypt’s
main gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan became subject
to recurring rebel attacks targeting the Egyptian government and aimed at cutting gas export revenues.29
After more than a year of unstable Egyptian gas supplies, in April 2012 Israel faced the cancellation of
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its existing gas supply contract by the newly elected
Muslim Brotherhood government, which deprived
Israel of its primary source of natural gas imports.30 Israel’s domestic power sector was effectively saved by
the country’s recent discoveries of its own resources,
and the rapid start of production from the offshore
Tamar field largely compensated for the natural gas
deficit resulting from the cutoff of Egyptian supplies.31
But the evident vulnerability of Israel to disruption of
energy supplies from its Arab neighbors undoubtedly
has strengthened the political lobbies within Israel that
oppose any export of Israeli hydrocarbon resources
at all.32 These lobbies consider Israel’s hydrocarbon
resources more of a sovereignty asset than a mere
commercial commodity.
Israel’s political isolation within the Arab world
also affects the range of companies willing to invest
there. This is of particular significance in the context
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology, which will
have to be acquired from the small range of international companies with the relevant know-how. The
continued weight of Arab oil and gas producers as
critically important partners for major international
oil companies (IOCs) means that investment decisions involving Israel are especially sensitive. Fear of
sanctions by Arab countries against IOCs and service
companies operating in Israel may deter otherwise
interested companies from entering the Israeli market. Similarly, Cyprus may experience similar consequences with respect to companies with significant
exposure in Turkey, although the scope of these repercussions is likely to be smaller than in the case of
Israel, given the relatively smaller number of international companies operating in Turkey as opposed to
the Arab world as a whole.

11

The future development of offshore hydrocarbon
resources in Israel and Lebanon’s sea waters could
face still further complications, due to the two countries’ rival claims over both onshore and offshore
maritime territory. Israel’s decision in early-2013 to
grants exploration licenses for the Syrian-claimed Golan Heights spells potential for another armed conflict
between the two parties should substantial hydrocarbon resources be discovered.33 While Syria’s current
domestic situation may to a certain extent reduce the
probability of any impeding conflict in the short term,
a more immediate potential conflict area awaits farther along Israel’s maritime boundaries. Lebanese-Israeli borders remain only informally demarcated, and
follow the 2000 Blue Line with unresolved border disputes both on land and offshore. Lebanese and Israeli
claims over maritime territory overlap over an area of
around 850 square kilometers (km)—not a large area
by international standards, but one over which neither country appears willing to compromise.34 None
of Israel’s confirmed discoveries so far fall into the
disputed area, but Lebanon’s 2013 licensing round included bidding options for one out of three possible
exploration blocks on the Lebanese side that crosses
Israel’s claimed maritime boundary.35
Against a history of previous war and military intervention between Israel and Lebanon, mutual threats
of using military force to protect the integrity of what
each side considers its exclusive economic zone reach
back to 2010, when the issue first emerged in both parties’ news media; Israeli Infrastructure Minister Uzi
Landau (the Ministry of Infrastructure, remaining at
the time of this writing the relevant ministry for Israel’s hydrocarbon developments), for instance, commented in June 2010:
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We will not hesitate to use our force and strength to
protect not only the rule of law but the international
maritime law. . . . Whatever we find, they [Lebanon’s
parliament and political circles] will have something
to say. That’s because they’re not challenging our findings and so-called occupation of the sea. Our very existence here is a matter of occupation for them. These
areas are within the economic waters of Israel.36

These remarks followed previous statements made
by Lebanese Energy Minister Gebran Basil that Lebanon “will not allow Israel or any company working
for Israeli interests to take any amount of our gas that
is falling in our [exclusive economic] zone.”37
Meanwhile, the dispute also has delayed the delimitation of the Cypriot-Lebanese and Cypriot-Israeli
exclusive economic maritime zones, despite Cypriot
efforts to mediate in its own right between the two parties.38 In the case of an armed conflict between Israel
and Lebanon, the security of the wider Levant region
could once again be at stake, with a possible escalation
of the conflict into neighboring Syria and the Palestinian Territories, as well as (with historical precedents)
Jordan and Egypt. In combination, the pre-existing
political problems in all of these countries—Syria destabilizing into de facto civil war, Egypt in the midst
of political instability, the Palestinians and Lebanese
lacking stable political cores—the potential for a new,
escalating regional war is a threatening scenario indeed. Offshore hydrocarbon development plans along
the East Mediterranean coast would immediately be
impacted, as a high-profile target for military and terrorist attacks. Not least for this reason, both Israel and
Lebanon face serious concerns over the desirability of
potential future LNG liquefaction plants along their
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crowded and densely inhabited coastlines, as well as
the vulnerability of as-yet-unbuilt gas pipelines across
both countries and, possibly onward, to neighboring countries.39 Cyprus, too, could be affected, given
the geographic proximity between Israel’s largest
gas field, Leviathan—a potential site for Israeli gas
production facilities—and Cyprus’s gas field where
production is expected first, Block 12. Wider regional
conflict could also affect Egypt’s significantly larger
offshore gas production, further escalating the extent
of potential disruptions caused by Israeli-Lebanese
conflicts over gas resources.
The Cypriot Knot.
On the other side of the East Mediterranean shore,
another decades-old conflict holds similar potential
for re-escalation into armed conflict in case of unresolved rivaling claims over territorial waters and their
potential hydrocarbon riches. Cyprus has been the site
of confrontation among different interests for most of
its modern history. Greek and Turkish Cypriots continue to inhabit the island state divided into the Greekdominated South and the Turkish-dominated North.
The Republic of Cyprus, which on paper comprises
the whole island, is internationally recognized and a
member of the EU, while the Turkish communities in
the North of the island declare themselves a separate
state, recognized only by Turkey.40 This division of the
island state has led to rivaling claims by both groups
over land and maritime territory, and now over the
allocation of potential export revenues from offshore
gas reserves. While the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus has assured that Cyprus’s gas-export revenues would benefit all Cypriots once a comprehen-

14

sive peace agreement has been settled, the absence of
any such agreement, or indeed, of prospects for the
conclusion of a comprehensive peace any time in the
near future, raise questions over how Cyprus’s two
communities will accommodate the expected inflow
of revenues once Cypriot gas leaves Cyprus’s planned
export facilities. This is also pertinent in view of previous propositions to use Cyprus’s hydrocarbon
wealth as collateral for current and future national
borrowing.41
Turkish-Cypriot claims have been supported on
the political level by Cyprus’s key ally, Turkey, which
has warned Nicosia to suspend development of any
offshore reserves until the Cypriot question is eventually settled; Turkey, in fact, called the start of Cypriot
exploration activities a “provocative and irresponsible” act42 and stated that it would do “whatever necessary” to defend Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot rights.43
A further statement followed issuance of Cyprus’s
second offshore tender round in February 2012 that
Turkey would “take all necessary measures to protect its rights and interests in the maritime areas falling within its continental shelf.”44 International Crisis
Group observers report complaints by Greek Cypriots
over Turkish harassment inside Cyprus’s maritime
zone, where Turkey has reportedly carried out military exercises, approaching within five nautical miles
of installations—described by Greek-Cypriot observers as “gunboat diplomacy.”45
In the absence of a comprehensive settlement, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community signed an
agreement delineating their continental shelf in September 2011, assigning exploration licenses for seven
offshore blocks, six of them in Greek-Cypriot areas
(Blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, and 13).46 The Turkish state oil
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company Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO)
reportedly has since begun to explore for hydrocarbon
resources inside the Turkish-Cypriot-claimed territories,47 despite (at the time of this writing) no apparent
confrontation over exploration efforts with consortia
operating in Nicosia’s tendered-out license blocks. Potential for future conflict over offshore territories also
results from direct Turkish maritime claims, which
overlap with some of Nicosia’s demarcated offshore
blocks in the southwest. The four blocks in question
formed part of the package of blocks on offer for licensing in the country’s last licensing round in 2012, but,
despite reporting bids, ended up not being licensed
out.48 It is more likely, however, that Cyprus will end
up tendering out the respective blocks in question at
a future bidding round, raising a parallel question to
the Israeli-Lebanese water dispute as to how the different parties involved would react to a substantial
hydrocarbon discovery in the disputed blocks.
Any suspension of the development of Cyprus’s
offshore resources would likely alarm not only the
Cypriot government, but many of Cyprus’s main political and economic allies as well. Cyprus, bailed out
by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EUbacked rescue loan of $10 bn in March 2013 but still on
the edge of economic bankruptcy, has already begun
to build part of its future economic recovery plans on
the growth of an indigenous natural gas industry and
on the expected revenue from the export of natural
gas from its offshore territories.49 Politically caused
delays in this development would likely exacerbate
the normal delays resulting from potentially disappointing geologic and field performance (as has been
the case following Cyprus’s second appraisal drilling
in October 2013).50 This would further complicate the
country’s already precarious financial situation.
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An armed conflict between the two Cypriot communities, possibly involving Turkey, would place yet
another military conflict at the periphery of the EU,
threatening the stability of the EU’s most eastern border and its political and commercial relations with
Turkey. Continued deadlock over the Cypriot question, contributed to by disputes over offshore hydrocarbon reserves, would also continue to hamper the
ability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
partners to cooperate more closely with Cyprus, given NATO member Turkey’s continued resistance to
strategic NATO cooperation. Cyprus’s geostrategic
location between West Asia and Eurasia, on the other
hand, renders Cyprus a highly desirable NATO partner, as well as a strategic partner for the United States,
which maintains strategically important military facilities there. Escalating conflict between Cyprus and
Turkey may also further feed into existing political
instabilities across the East and Northeastern Mediterranean, including Turkey itself, which witnessed
political turmoil in early-2013 and borders the already
unstable Syria. A crescent of disintegration along the
East Mediterranean coastline is indeed a worst-case
scenario both for the region itself, and for its NATO
partners.51
The East Mediterranean and the Arab Spring.
The outbreak of political protest in North Africa
and its gradual spread across the Arab world since late2010, popularly known as the Arab Spring, affected the
East Mediterranean as well. Syria has seen a dramatic
deterioration of its domestic political situation since
early-2011, gradually falling into civil war, which has
led to several tens of thousands of human casualties
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and more than 2.3 million recorded refugees.52 A series
of alleged chemical weapons attacks against Syrian civilians in the suburbs of Damascus in September 2013
led to weeks of debate around a possible international
or U.S. military intervention; this debate followed U.S.
President Barack Obama’s previous declarations that
chemical weapons used against civilians in Syria were
a “red line” for the United States that would prompt a
reconsideration of the U.S. Government’s opposition
to military intervention.53 Syria’s civil war has led to
the cancellation for the time being of all Syrian plans
to further explore and develop its offshore Mediterranean oil and gas resources, meaning new discoveries
and production capacity from Syria are now expected
to be years away, and subject to the stabilization of
domestic politics.
Lebanon, into which a large share of Syrian refugees have fled since 2011, appears on the verge of being drawn into the conflict as well, as evident from the
resurgence of shooting, assassinations, and sectarian
violence. Having been largely spared Arab Springrelated political protests, Lebanon’s domestic political
life has nevertheless been in deadlock as a result of
familiar Lebanese political factors, in addition to the
growing threat of resurfacing large-scale sectarian
violence.54 Hence, it comes as little surprise that Lebanese plans to explore and tender out its first offshore
blocks have been delayed by more than a year. This
was precipitated by the inability of the country’s policymaking circles to agree on the sectarian composition of the Petroleum Administration, a body required
by the country’s petroleum law for the exploration of
Lebanese waters to begin.55 With no government in
place throughout most of 2013, further delays are now
unavoidable until a new government is able to put
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into place the decrees required to issue tenders after
the country’s first bidding round in early-2013.56
Lebanon and Syria demonstrate that progress in
hydrocarbon development in the East Mediterranean
may in reality be halted by domestic politics more than
by—as has been widely speculated— cross-border political conflicts. In the case of continued political deadlock in the two countries, prospects for development
of East Mediterranean gas resources other than in Cyprus and Israel look unlikely in the near term, promising little positive economic impact other than in those
two states. The continuing political destabilization of
Lebanon and Syria is highly undesirable, given the
impetus of war and political stalemate in a densely
populated but heavily compromised region. Instability in Syria and Lebanon also affects regional risk ratings and the attractiveness of foreign investment into
regional offshore developments, and thus dilutes any
prospect of more comprehensive regional cooperation
in both the political and economic spheres.
By contrast, the most recent outbreak of military
confrontation in July between the Palestinian organization Hamas and Israel in Gaza has so far had no
direct impact on East Mediterranean gas. On the one
hand, this is because Palestinian gas is not yet being
developed, thereby precluding any impact of the conflict on Palestinian gas; on the other, Israel’s gas fields
are relatively remote from the conflict point, with
Hamas rockets being directed at Israeli land rather
than at sea. Once Israeli gas flows into Gaza’s nowdestroyed sole power plant, theoretically little incentive exists for Palestinian paramilitary groups to bomb
their own gas supplies. This contrasts with the already
high impact of Egyptian political instability on the
likelihood of Israeli gas flowing across the Sinai Pen-
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insula, which is more likely to continue to affect the
viability of any onshore pipeline trade option between
Israel and Egypt.
NATURAL GAS, REGIONAL COOPERATION,
AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The recent East Mediterranean discoveries raise a
whole range of commercial and security-related questions: What will the long-term strategy be to monetize
the significant value offered by the region’s commercial offshore gas and possibly oil resources? Will regional political rivalries, or indeed, domestic political
stalemate, hinder the development of these resources
over the medium term? Will the East Mediterranean’s
newly discovered hydrocarbon wealth indeed help
the region overcome some of its historical divisions, or
will those same divisions be further reinforced by the
presence of what looks at present like a significant potential source of new regional income? How will U.S.
strategy in the region feed into the direction in which
these various factors will play? The possible addition
of yet greater offshore hydrocarbon resources—both
of natural gas and of oil—alongside the East Mediterranean shores, which also include Syria and Lebanon,
will likely add further complexity to the region’s already rapidly changing energy security architecture
and the direction of future regional energy trade. We
examine some of the (currently) most likely regional
energy development options, followed by thoughts
about the future U.S. role within this newly emerging regional context. It should be noted that the reality is likely to be a combination of different scenarios,
as exporter Israel, but potentially also other future
East Mediterranean gas producers, will seek security
through diversity of export markets.
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Scenario 1: Cooperation through regional LNG.
Global trade in LNG has been growing rapidly
since the 1990s and, for many new gas producers, has
become the method of choice to market their natural
gas resources. In the East Mediterranean, too, LNG
may capture part of the export volume of natural gas
produced, with Cypriot plans to build an LNG liquefaction plant on the southeastern coast of the island,
as well as various LNG-related plans currently being
discussed by Israel. The outlook of the East Mediterranean as a new LNG-exporting region is hence an
interesting prospect.
LNG offers many logistical and—under the right
conditions—some commercial advantages over traditional pipeline exports. LNG is flexible and can be exported across regions, eliminating the regional nature
of pipeline-dependent natural gas trade and thereby
allowing new gas exporters to become players in what
is slowly becoming an increasingly global market for
natural gas. Global exports, even if (currently) small
in total volume, as is the case for the East Mediterranean, hold many geostrategic benefits in addition to
the commercial value of reaching new, and potentially
premium, markets for gas; it follows that the ability
of previously import-dependent countries such as Cyprus, Israel, and Lebanon to supply LNG to Europe,
Latin America, or even Asia appears politically attractive both on a domestic and regional level. LNG markets such as Asia-Pacific further promise prospects of
substantially higher prices than pipeline gas is likely
to fetch in the immediate region or in Europe, despite
the need for care over forward-looking price assumptions at a time (2020-30), when pricing structures and
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price levels are likely to differ significantly from those
of today.57 LNG exports also invite the option for gas
producers to engage in the increasingly lucrative
spot trade of LNG in addition to long-term contracts,
once again adding trade flexibility and potentially
raising profits.
The East Mediterranean producers of gas—Cyprus
and Israel in particular—also hold very specific reasons to consider LNG over and above pipeline gas.
Geographically, Cyprus in particular remains an island state with no overland options for pipeline infrastructure, adding to the cost of pipeline exports via
subsea pipelines. The closest subsea route for Cypriot
pipeline exports would lead via Turkey, a commercially sensible option but one that is highly unlikely
on political grounds (at the time of this writing), given
the continually unresolved Cyprus question and Turkey’s consequent reluctance to trade with the Republic
of Cyprus.58 An alternative pipeline route to Greece,
while politically more desirable, involves a significant
geographical diversion of a Cypriot pipeline route,
more than tripling the distance to land, while the eventual market price paid by Greece—like Cyprus still at
the verge of financial collapse—is unlikely to be anywhere near enough to justify the enormous additional
cost of a subsea pipeline connecting the two remotest
parts of Europe. Other pipeline routes could connect
Cyprus via subsea pipelines to Israel or Egypt—both
natural gas producers in their own right—but both
displaying a high degree of significant political problems that are unlikely to render them desirable transit
locations for Cypriot gas in the first place.
Israel itself, being a political more than a geographical island inside the Levant, faces a history of complicated political relations with its Arab neighbors; it has
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been at war with all of them at different points of time
since its establishment in 1948. Given the continued
de facto war with neighbors Syria and Lebanon, any
gas trade with Israel’s northern neighbors is unlikely
in the near future; nor is it possible for Israel to export natural gas via existing pipeline infrastructure
onward to Turkey using the land route via Lebanon
and/or Syria. Relations with southern neighbors Jordan and Egypt and the Palestinians have, by contrast,
been more varied and would, in principle, allow for
pipeline trade. However, those elements inside Israel
who would oppose natural gas trade with Arab neighbors on political grounds, in addition to uncertainty
over the viability of these trade routes, render LNG
for Israel, as much as for Cyprus, a regionally independent gas-export option with significant commercial potential under the right circumstances.59
Individual LNG or a Regional LNG Hub?
Cyprus has already embraced LNG exports as its
main export strategy for the early-2020s—not least because of significant interest by operating companies
Noble and its partners in monetizing Cypriot gas in
the most commercially straightforward way.60 Disappointing appraisal drilling results in October 2013
have for the time being cast doubts over the commercial viability of an LNG terminal in Cyprus as long
as no additional resources are found offshore Cyprus
or brought in from neighboring countries sharing a
potential LNG terminal, such as Israel. Potential cooperation between Cyprus and Israel over shared LNG
facilities at Vassilikos has been discussed in the media
and by political and commercial interest groups. A regional LNG hub on Cyprus would solve two parallel
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problems. Cyprus could attract additional funding and
investment, making use of economies of scale, while
raising the commercial viability of LNG exports under the current time plan in case of less-than-expected
eventual production rates for Block 12, the only block
currently far enough explored to start production by
producer Noble’s ambitious time schedule. This argument has gained additional urgency following Noble’s
sobering results from its second appraisal drilling in
October 2013, which some observers have interpreted
as throwing back Cypriot LNG export plans by up to
2 years if no additional gas can be sourced.61
Israel, on the other hand, would similarly benefit in
financial terms from the arrangement, saving investment costs for a new greenfield project inside Israeli
territory, while solving the politically controversial
question of where to place an Israeli LNG export terminal along the country’s crowded and terror-prone
coastline. Similar factors affect Lebanon’s gas export
plans, since if Lebanon’s own potential offshore gas
production materializes in the coming years, Lebanon
too could be a potential partner for a Cyprus-based
regional LNG hub. Lebanese and Israeli cooperation
with Cyprus over LNG exports will obviously be
mutually exclusive—implying a head start for Israel,
whose gas development program is significantly more
advanced than that of Lebanon—while a potential
Israeli alteration of plans to reserve its gas production for domestic supply or regional pipeline trade
could open a window of opportunity for Lebanon at a
later stage.
Opponents to an Israeli-Cypriot entente, primarily
within Israel, fear Israeli dependence on a third country for Israeli gas exports, which may expose Israel
to the use of its gas export facilities as political lever-
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age, in addition to reduced tax revenues for the Israeli
state.62 Shared Cypriot-Israeli LNG facilities also hold
the potential for diplomatic interference with Israel’s
parallel strategy of improving political and commercial relations with neighboring Turkey, with discussions over Israeli pipeline exports to Turkey ongoing
in parallel to talks with Cyprus. In the case of exacerbation of armed conflict within Cyprus, Israeli gas
exports, moreover, might be held hostage alongside
Cypriot gas, a prospect that will cause unease in Israeli policy circles despite its relative unlikelihood
at present.
The expected volume of East Mediterranean LNG
exports under a best-case scenario throughout the
2020s should be seen as moderate in size. Cyprus’s
initial plans were for initially one LNG train of around
5-10 million metric tons per annum in the early-2020s,
possibly to be added to in subsequent years by one
or two more trains, although current reserve corrections seem to disallow this target. Israel, if and when
it decides to export LNG, may add an additional one
to two trains. Even in the currently unclear case of
another, possibly Lebanese, LNG train to come on
stream by the late-2020s, this volume is no strategic
competitor to the new, large LNG exporters, Australia, East Africa, and, possibly, the United States,
over key premium markets in Asia.63 Hence, the overwhelming commercial success of Cypriot LNG is by
no means guaranteed, despite obvious economic potential in principle. Floating LNG (FLNG), too, could
be an option, in particular as it would offer an answer
to smaller 3-5-tcf fields such as Block 12 and Tamar,
in addition to its application on larger fields such as
Leviathan. The technology for this would need to be
brought in by an outside company, since experience in
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FLNG, a relatively new technology option,64 remains
limited to a handful of international companies. While
Woodside, for instance, has been strongly advocating
FLNG in Israel, the question is which company would
supply the technology, given the possible negative
implications for any company with Arab country exposure. Cyprus may find it easier to attract a range of
experienced companies, but the Cypriot government’s
past focus on onshore LNG renders this option, so far,
one with no systematic policy focus in Cyprus.
Scenario 2: Regional Pipeline Trade.
Looking beyond LNG, there are many important
reasons to consider the potential role East Mediterranean gas could play in regional exports. The Middle
East and North Africa are among the world’s fastestgrowing regional demand centers for natural gas, and
despite significant gas reserves there is an increasing
shortfall of gas production to satisfy domestic market
demand. Energy Information Agency (EIA) projections suggest total Middle Eastern gas demand will
almost double until 2040, rendering the Middle East
second only to Asia-Pacific in the rate of its market
growth for several decades to come (see Figures 1 and
2). Turkey, another rapidly growing energy market
bordering the East Mediterranean, is also a potential
market for East Mediterranean gas, as well, because
of its strategic geographical location. Turkey is an important future transit hub for pipeline gas from West
and Central Asia to Europe, as part of European efforts to diversify their gas supplies away from Russia
via the Southern Corridor.65
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Note: The Middle East includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.
Source: EIA, Washington, DC, 2014.

Figure 1. Projected Natural Gas Demand in the
Middle East (bcf), 2010-40.

Note: The Middle East includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE,
and Yemen.
Source: EIA (2014)

Figure 2. Projected Natural Gas Demand Growth in
the Middle East (Percentage), 2010-40.
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An Arab-Israeli “Peace Pipeline”?
Part of Israel’s options to market and monetize its
natural gas lie in its direct regional neighborhood, and
a series of initial agreements with Israel’s Arab neighbors since early-2014 indicates that Israel is indeed
positively inclined toward these options. The Palestinian Territories, economically marginalized and with
no energy resources beyond the so-far-undeveloped
offshore Gaza Marine, proved indeed to be the first
Israeli gas customers in January 2014. After several
months of private negotiations, Palestine Power Generation Co. signed an agreement to purchase around
4.75-bcm of natural gas over a 20-year period, worth
some $1.2 bn,66 an initial agreement followed in subsequent months by similar agreements with Union
Fenosa and BG Group in Egypt over the potential supply of some 1.75-tcf of Israeli gas to Egyptian markets,
and up to 3.75-tcf for export as LNG through Egypt’s
since late-2013 largely idle liquefaction plants.67 The
Israeli-Palestinian entente came amidst reintensified
efforts by international and U.S. diplomats to forge a
greater Middle East peace agreement, contrasting with
years of unsuccessful attempts to gain tangible results
from broader political negotiations. An International
Business Times commentator pointedly contrasted
the decades of fruitless effort on political settlement
with what a few months of negotiations between commercial companies on both sides have been able to
achieve.68
While the volume of gas and the value of the trade
agreement are not large by the standards of potential
Israeli or Cypriot gas exports via LNG into international markets, or even by pipeline into larger regional

28

energy markets, the Israeli-Palestinian gas trade agreement symbolizes the political and commercial viability of regional pipeline exports, including from Israel.
While politically appealing from an Israeli perspective
(Palestinian dependence on Israeli gas for the security
of electricity supplied to Palestinian homes ideally reduces the incentives for Palestinian politicians to forge
a new full-scale military conflict with Israel), the trade
deal is also economically beneficial for both sides. On
the one hand, Israel earns export revenues involving
only a small volume of Israeli gas (in contrast with
the high-volume, long-term contracts associated, for
instance, with LNG exports that are opposed in Israel
on political grounds). The Palestinian Authority and
Palestine Power pay significantly less for Israeli gas
than they would for the alternative of high-cost international oil imports, which, so far, are the only fuel
alternative to natural gas for the Palestinians in view
of the lack of gas supplies anywhere in their regional
vicinity.69
This mutually beneficial trade arrangement between Israelis and Palestinians could also be extendable into Israel’s other Arab neighborhoods; both
Jordan and Egypt are growing gas markets, short of
natural gas supplies—in the case of Egypt, this is also
due to lacking domestic investment, exacerbated by
more than 3 years of political turmoil following the
Arab Spring—and economically overburdened by existing government spending. Alternative fuel imports
from international markets are high-cost options, with
costs for oil imports having more than doubled over
the 2000s as a result of rising oil prices and Jordan and
Egypt’s continuingly high reliance on oil-fired power
generation.70 Jordan signed a gas trading agreement
with Israel in February 2014 worth $500 million, with
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the option to turn Israel into Jordan’s main supplier
over the coming years.71 Commercially speaking,
this gas trading agreement is likely to be the lowestcost energy supply option available to Jordan over
the coming years—a truth likely applicable to Egypt
as well.
While Jordan relies on international loans, Egypt
currently survives on financial and in-kind aid from
several Gulf Cooperation Council countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait.72 For
Egypt, too, any medium- to long-term energy supply
option will rest on a low-cost fuel supply, with Israel ironically offering the most likely competitively
priced gas option. In addition to the cost of fuel, the
largely pre-existing pipeline infrastructure connecting
the three countries—because of Egypt’s historical gas
exports to both Israel and Jordan—implies that capital
costs for an initial infrastructure investment would be
low and, unlike in the case of Israeli LNG, would not
require 20-year contracts to finance the entire initial
capital cost.73 (See Figures 3 and 4.)

Source: EIA, Washington, DC, 2014.

Figure 3. Egypt’s Narrowing Domestic Gas Balance
(bcf per annum).
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Source: EIA, Washington, DC, 2013, with data from BP and
Cedigaz.

Figure 4. Egypt’s Pipeline and LNG Exports (bcf/a).
Both Jordan and Egypt also offer additional benefits to the Israeli side, which, in turn, may positively
influence the price of Israeli gas supplied to these markets. Egypt already has two LNG liquefaction plants,
both of which operate below capacity because of
Egypt’s domestic gas shortage, with long-term supply
contracts in principle tying Egyptian gas into export
markets.74 Israeli gas could supply these LNG facilities,
using existing infrastructure rather than constructing
new facilities in the East Mediterranean, and capturing the LNG market share—possibly via gas swaps
with Egypt—thereby solving both Egypt’s problem of
fulfilling supply contract conditions, while offering Israel access to LNG markets. Similarly, Jordan has been
considering turning its Red Sea port of Aqaba into an
LNG hub, and could host a yet to-be-built LNG facility that could export Israeli, or possibly later, Lebanese
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LNG, with an eye on premium Asian markets.75 In this
context, Jordan may prove to be an even more attractive option than Egypt, given that Suez Canal fees can
be avoided while reaching Asian markets. Both Jordan and Egypt could benefit from the resultant transit
fees, while the mutually beneficial trade arrangement
between them and Israel would likely forge beneficial
political stability across gas-transiting borders; Jordan
would also see additional infrastructure investment,
providing a new technology branch, foreign investment and new employment options. The resulting
pipeline trade scenario would resemble only at first
sight a regional “peace pipeline” approach; in reality, it could be a fully functioning and commercially
very beneficial arrangement for both the Arab and the
Israeli sides.
The most important stumbling block to such a regional solution will undoubtedly be politics, on both
sides. Israeli politicians, some of whom remain opposed to any Israeli gas exports, have dominated public debates and tried to block the Israeli government’s
decision to allow gas exports rather than reserve Israel’s newly found hydrocarbon wealth for the domestic market. On the Jordanian-Egyptian sides, many
political groups and a majority of the population will
be opposed to natural gas trade on political grounds.
The Palestinian cause, including continuingly unresolved questions such as Palestinian statehood and
land claims, Jewish settlements, and the status of Jerusalem and of several million Palestinian refugees (1.9
million of which have been registered by the United
Nations in Jordan alone)76 resonates with a vast part
of these countries’ populations and renders the idea
of Jordanian and Egyptian gas payments contributing to Israel’s security budget deeply uncomfortable.
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Egypt’s natural gas trade deal under the Mubarak regime during the 2000s sparked political protest and
heated debate, with some civil society institutions taking the administration to court to stop Egyptian gas
exports to Israel.77 Moreover, Jordan’s King Abdallah
II and the ruling Hashemite family rely on political
support from East Bank tribal families, the loss of
whose support over a Jordanian-Israeli gas trade deal
would come at an unacceptable political cost.78 Also,
trade with Israel in natural gas would render its Arab
trade partners—Jordan and Egypt, to very different
extents—dependent on Israeli gas deliveries, providing Israel with a powerful strategic ransom in the case
of any new outbreak of military confrontation.
REGIONAL PIPELINE GAS INTO TURKEY
AND EUROPE
Turkey is another potentially significant export
partner for Israel, and, in the much-longer term, once
the Cypriot question is resolved, an export partner for
Cyprus. Turkey is a rapidly growing demand market,
the largest in the wider region, with some of the highest regional domestic gas prices. This also renders the
Turkish market attractive for supply projects involving an initially higher capital cost, such as for longdistance and subsea pipelines. For Cyprus itself, a direct subsea pipeline to Turkey would entail the lowest
capital costs of any export option, although politics
are unlikely to render this option palatable at the time
of this writing. Even from Israel, a subsea pipeline link
to Turkey has been assessed as logistically and commercially feasible, and would be for Israel the only option to reach Turkey by pipeline while the land route
via Lebanon and Syria remains closed. (See Figure 5.)
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and 6.)

Source: Authors, based on EIA, Washington, DC, 2013.

Figure 5. Natural Gas Consumption,
5-yr Compound Average Annual Growth, 2008-12,
Selected Countries and Regions.

Source: EIA, Washington, DC, 2013.

Figure 6. Turkey’s Growing Gas Market, bcf.
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Strategically, Turkey offers further attractions.
Turkish interests in promoting itself as a new gas
transit hub for European gas would also offer East
Mediterranean gas exporters the long-term prospect
of 1 day exporting gas to Europe, albeit in small volumes.79 The commercial value of East Mediterranean
gas exports to Europe may be moderate, and would
still entail more questions from the producers’ sides
regarding the price Europe is likely to pay for new gas
contracts in view of the changing European gas pricing environment. However, the strategic value of East
Mediterranean gas exports into Europe may be high,
given European interests in diversifying sources of the
gas supply away from traditional Russian supplies
are also important political considerations. The 2014
Ukraine crisis, which (at the time of this writing) has
led to the imposition of U.S. and European sanctions
against Russia in the aftermath of the alleged shooting
down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014
over Ukrainian territory, has arguably added further
strategic value to any future alternative gas supply for
Southeastern Europe. Cypriot gas sold to Turkey, and
potentially onward to Europe, could also constitute an
important basis for renewed peace talks between the
two sides, providing an important commercial carrot
for the pursuit of specific outcomes of any negotiations between the two sides. Similarly, Israeli gas sold
to Turkey via the Cypriot exclusive economic zone
could benefit Cyprus by way of parallel gas supply
and transit fees. It could also open the Turkish route,
albeit initially only for Israeli gas, on the Cypriot side,
while providing Turkey with a gas corridor that could
be further opened up to Cypriot gas in the future if
political tensions ease.80
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Israeli-Turkish relations have undergone various
phases, having been troubled by ideological differences as well as the 2010 killing of Turkish Palestine
activists on a Turkish ship off Israel’s coasts. Both
Turkey and Israel could nevertheless have considerable interest in gas trade, because of the commercial
attractiveness of the option. Turkey also has an intrinsic interest in gas supply options other than dominant
supplier Russia, while its main alternative, Iran, has
been under sanctions and appears an unlikely incremental supplier for Turkey’s fast-rising gas demand.81
Other supply options for Turkey are complicated, for
apart from the cost-intensive option of LNG, other
regional supplies from Iraq and the Caspian—politically charged in their own right—have not been forthcoming. Former U.S. Ambassador Matt Bryza sees a
possible advantageous entente:
A pipeline connecting Leviathan to the Turkish market, the most commercially efficient export option,
could help resurrect a strategic partnership dedicated
to regional prosperity and stability between Israel and
Turkey.82

The Israeli-Turkish option, because of its comparably lesser political hurdle, is also the most probable
medium-term option for East Mediterranean gas exports into Turkey. Besides political will on both sides,
one of the key obstacles to overcome in order to enable
both countries to trade with each other is undoubtedly a solution to the two countries’ conflict over the
Gaza flotilla incident, at which nine political activists
supporting the political cause of the Palestinians in
Gaza—including eight Turkish citizens—were killed
by Israeli soldiers during a military raid.83 After the
Turkish downgrading of relations to second secre36

tary level and cooling bilateral relations thereafter, a
telephone conversation in March 2013 between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—during which
Netanyahu apologized for operational mistakes by
Israel during the flotilla incident—has since raised
hopes for a rapprochement of the two sides.84 A likely
next step will involve financial compensation for the
families of those killed in the incident, after which gas
trade relations between Israel and Turkey may well
be a politically palatable option. The role of international intermediaries such as the United States could
well consist of political support for this reconciliation
process, providing forums and overall policy support
where required.
The Cypriot-Turkish case is significantly more
complicated, and looks difficult in the absence of
a more comprehensive peace arrangement and the
distribution of resource revenues from the export of
Cypriot gas exports among all Cypriot citizens, including in the North. International intermediation
and diplomatic efforts once more provide an essential
background to progress in the matter. So does American mediation and policy support alongside the EU in
facilitating talks and trust-building mechanisms that
would render Cypriot-Turkish gas trade a desirable
long-term outcome of fruitful negotiation.
U.S. Diplomatic and Security Cooperation.
U.S. diplomatic and military support has a pivotal
role to play in the East Mediterranean’s complex geopolitical landscape, and its importance will only grow
as the value of the natural resources at stake increases.
On the Western part of the East Mediterranean, both
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Cyprus and Turkey are important partners for U.S.
interests in different regions. Cyprus is a NATO partner and a long-term strategic ally of Europe and the
United States in the East Mediterranean. It is wedged
between Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East and,
as such, is a perfect location for regionally based intelligence and defense systems. Turkey is a NATO
partner and a key location for the stationing of a U.S.
early-warning-radar system as part of the NATO missile defense system for Europe. It is an important U.S.
ally with an interest in regional democratic transition
and stability, and is a political buffer between Europe
on the one hand, and unstable neighboring countries
Syria, Iraq, and Iran on the other.85 Making regional
gas developments and trade an economic pillar in U.S.
foreign engagement in the region could be a highly
beneficial way of concentrating resources in a region
that may yet listen to economic incentives after many
decades of unsuccessful, politically motivated rounds
of negotiation.
Diplomatically, the U.S. role could entail a whole
range of areas for mediation, and for contributing to
the realization of different East Mediterranean project
options. Within the Cypriot-Turkish knot, as well as on
the side of Israeli-Turkish relations, ample scope exists
for the intensification of diplomatic efforts that would
help Cyprus develop its offshore resources peacefully
and without ensuing conflict with mainland Turkey.
In this context, the current diplomatic crisis between
Russia, the EU, and the United States could serve as
an important basis for future efforts by American and
European partners to foster diplomatic talks between
the two Cypriot communities on the one hand, and
Turkey on the other, to create an environment more
conductive to the export of East Mediterranean gas to
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Europe through the Turkish route. Furthermore, and
in the case of LNG, a Cypriot LNG terminal as currently planned does not require a benevolent Turkish
stance toward Cypriot exports, nor a comprehensive
peace agreement between the Cypriot communities.
Nevertheless, stable relationships would help remove
barriers that could later on threaten Vassilikos LNG,
such as the Turkish-Cypriot contestation of Cypriot
exploration and production efforts, and the possible
exacerbation of maritime border disagreements into
armed violence. The ideal inroads to prevent such
scenarios would likely involve:
1. A rapprochement between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, supporting LNG export
plans from Vassilikos and the secure development of
hydrocarbon resources from tendered-out exploration
blocks;
2. A Turkish-Cypriot rapprochement that enables
the above; and,
3. A Turkish-Israeli détente that helps the two
countries overcome mutual animosities.
International efforts to promote a comprehensive
settlement of the Cypriot question have been ongoing
for many decades. Natural gas discoveries could facilitate the process. However, the vital interests of both
European and U.S. partners of Cyprus in the resolution of the issue render continuous, intensified efforts
in this direction ever more important. Cyprus’s natural gas development offers a powerful carrot for new
and intensified regional talks and the introduction of a
new regional roadmap to peace and cooperation over
these new natural resources. The United States, as an
intermediary, is of prime importance in this regard. A
diplomatic ally both of Europe and of the Republic of
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Cyprus, it is also a NATO partner of Turkey, thereby
enjoying mutual respect and relations with both political sides. Meanwhile, American diplomatic strength
could prove critical in engaging all sides constructively in both open- and closed-door meetings.
On the Middle Eastern side, any escalation of territorial disputes over offshore hydrocarbon resources
between Israel and Lebanon in particular would call
for U.S. support, and before that, diplomatic efforts to
reduce the risk of any outbreak of conflict. U.S.-Israeli
economic, diplomatic, and defense ties have been close
for many decades.86 It was partly as a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts that Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization returned to the negotiation table for
direct talks over a comprehensive peace agreement,
an effort that has brought the United States much recognition throughout the Arab world. The agreement
between Israelis and Palestinians to trade in natural
gas has been one detail within these negotiations.
However, this agreement underlines the considerable
potential that well-directed U.S. diplomatic efforts
can achieve, particularly after several years of stalled
relations among all three sides. There are numerous
precedents for the joint exploration and exploitation
of disputed territories for natural resources, which
could be considered for similar cases in the East Mediterranean, once more raising the potential benefits of
U.S. intermediation.87
U.S. interests also involve the peaceful exploitation of the Levant’s hydrocarbon wealth for reasons
beyond Israel’s sake; both neighboring Syria and
Lebanon remain key players on the region’s geopolitical map, underlying U.S. political calculations
vis-à-vis neighboring Iran.88 Economic and political
chaos in the two states, possibly fueled further by es-
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calating conflict with Israel, or between Lebanon and
Syria over their own respective maritime boundaries,
might contribute to a strengthening of those regional
political influences that U.S. policymakers would undoubtedly prefer to avoid. Neither does Israel benefit
from unstable neighboring states, for the potential for
growth in politically radical elements, in support of or
parallel to existing political groups such as Hezbollah,
poses additional security risks to Israel’s own territory. Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, are recipients
of substantial amounts of U.S. foreign aid, rendering
economic solutions to their long-standing domestic
energy woes, such as low-cost Israeli gas, a potential
area of interest for U.S. diplomatic efforts for reasons
beyond the clear political and economic policy considerations that will likely exist in Israeli policy circles.89
Both countries have struck historical peace deals with
Israel, and Jordan’s role in the Middle East Peace Process, in the Syrian Civil War (by taking in Syrian refugees), and U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence
cooperation90 render a facilitating U.S. role in IsraeliJordanian talks over mutual gas trade a potential area
for U.S. involvement.
U.S. diplomatic efforts have also been, and should
continue to be, directed at finding a comprehensive
peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians
that ends the decades-long stalemate that has led to
deeply unsatisfying outcomes for both sides. Israeli
as well as Palestinian offshore hydrocarbon resources
could play a significant role in facilitating mutual trust
and the willingness to cooperate, including between
Israel and a few of its other Arab neighbors, Jordan
and Egypt. Palestinian gas offshore Gaza furthermore
provides a potentially valuable economic prize, the
development of which could be tied to the stabiliza-
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tion of Israeli-Palestinian ties and the rebuilding of the
now wartorn Gaza Strip and the Palestinian economy
as a whole. It is, nevertheless, important to realize
the limitations of the approach of “peace pipelines”
to cement peace where underlying political disagreements remain unresolved. Therefore, using gas for the
purpose of solving political problems that remain unrelated to gas is a trap that should be carefully avoided. U.S. diplomatic support may also be specifically
needed in the already existing conflict between Israel
and Lebanon about the disputed maritime territory
across the 2,000 blue line—with ongoing U.S. mediation between the two parties to the conflict being an
important contribution to reducing the possibility of
escalation into military conflict.91
In the event of escalating regional tensions, the
United States also holds an important military position that could have an impact in securing the East
Mediterranean. Prospects for regional LNG exports,
based on Cyprus, with the possibility of Israeli and
later Lebanese LNG exports, raise the potential for
essential gas infrastructure to become a target of politically motivated sabotage, terrorist attacks, and, in
the case of cross-border military conflict, military attacks against LNG infrastructure on a much greater
scale than is currently possible. LNG plants, while in
principle not as dangerous a target as already traveling oil transport freighters in the East Mediterranean,
offer a highly symbolic target for attack, and unlike
the subsea pipeline infrastructure, are just as visible
as oil platforms. The additional potential for liquids
production from several East Mediterranean wells
further adds to the explosive potential that any targeted attack against natural gas production platforms in
the Mediterranean Sea could have. Limited distances
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between East Mediterranean neighbors means that
in many cases, results such as the destruction of gas
and oil production platforms and subsequent oil spills
into the East Mediterranean Sea would likely affect
neighboring countries as well; the densely populated
coastlines of Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon mean substantial parts of the populations could suffer collateral
damage from attacks against land infrastructure such
as onshore LNG export facilities and gas production
plants.
In Israel in particular, the prospect of an onshore
LNG plant along the crowded Israeli coastline and
its potential to become the target of terrorist attacks
has fueled a domestic debate about the desirability
of LNG exports via an Israeli land facility in the first
place—adding to those advocates calling for the total
cancellation of Israeli gas export plans for reasons of
energy security. Even in the case of offshore FLNG export facilities or a shared LNG facility on Vassilikos,
Israeli LNG plants could still be the targets of terrorist
activity or military attacks in case of an armed crossborder conflict after all; indeed, the potential for Cyprus to be drawn into such a conflict through attacks
against joint Israeli-Cypriot facilities will need to be
considered. U.S. military training and equipment support, and a U.S. diplomatic position supportive of both
Cyprus and Israel in case of any third party’s attack
against their energy infrastructure and gas developments, could prove essential in this equation.
CONCLUSION AND FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
The East Mediterranean region, with its multiplicity of long-standing, unresolved political and territorial
disputes and conflicts—a jigsaw of different political
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and economic interests geographically located where
Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East intercept—remains of critical geostrategic importance for U.S. interests. The recent discoveries of sizeable hydrocarbon resources, placed in the region’s former context of
energy-import dependency, provides a significant opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation in a way
that benefits all sides but also holds much potential to
complicate further the region’s conflict-prone geopolitical architecture. U.S. support, driven by key U.S.
interests in the area, eventually may prove critical to
help shape the way in which natural resources define
the East Mediterranean’s regional security landscape
over the coming years. In particular:
•	The stability of Cyprus is of great importance to
the continuity of U.S. military and intelligence
operations. To retain U.S. military communications facilities on the island, the U.S. Government should continue its efforts to support the
improvement of Cypriot-Turkish relations and
to ensure that conflicting interests and overlapping claims do not deteriorate to the point of a
conflict between two of its NATO allies.
•	
Israel’s security, and the stability of the Levant—in particular the Israel-Lebanon, IsraelJordan, and Israel-Palestinian Territories borders—lies at the heart of U.S. foreign policy in
the region. U.S. mediation to help find a sustainable modus operandi for the disputed territories, such as joint exploration and production
or the sharing of revenues could help prevent
further escalation into military conflict, with
the potential to destabilize the already fragile
region further.
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•	U.S. security and military support for its main
allies in the case of an eruption of natural resource conflict in the East Mediterranean may
prove essential in managing possible future
conflict; this involves cooperation in areas such
as intelligence and nonlethal security as well as
the evaluation of different risks associated with
the region’s various export options.
U.S. experience in information operations and strategic communications can help its partners in the East
Mediterranean craft their strategy for creating public
support for any negotiated regional gas trading and
cooperation framework. The lack of supportive public
sentiment in Egypt for collaborating with Israel, for
instance, is one of the key challenges to initiating any
commercial negotiations. The sustainable success of
a cooperation agreement depends on a capability to
study systematically and understand different audiences in a specific context to inform policy and shape
impactful communications messages. It should also
be obvious that any absence of visible U.S. diplomatic
and technical assistance could lead to a gradual change
of alliances among some parts of the region toward
emerging powers and potential new peace brokers
such as Russia—which already entertains a strong interest in East Mediterranean gas developments—and
notably China.
Finally, the East Mediterranean hydrocarbon discoveries offer the region’s economies a very real chance
to transform their domestic economies and their energy mixes, thereby creating viable long-term growth
and economic prosperity. U.S. support—diplomatic
and, where necessary, military—can form a potentially powerful element in the safeguarding of these
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long-term economic benefits, at little cost in relative
terms. In the wake of the political unrest and frustration that has swept the Arab streets since early-2010,
and Cyprus’s continuing difficult financial position,
this would be no small success. It would be no less
so in view of the added benefit of political peace and
stability in one of the world’s most conflicted regional
security systems in the 20th and 21st century.
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